Overview
On 23 September 1803, a comparatively small East India Company army attacked a much larger Maratha force near Assaye in the Deccan. Major-General Arthur Wellesley had about 4,500 troops immediately available, supported by roughly 5,000 allied cavalry and 17 guns. Opposing him was a combined army associated with Daulatrao Scindia and Raghoji II Bhonsle, commonly estimated at around 50,000 men and more than 100 pieces of artillery.
The result was a British victory, but not an easy or bloodless one. Maratha artillery inflicted severe casualties, two British battalions were nearly destroyed, and Colonel Patrick Maxwell, who led a decisive cavalry attack, was killed. The East India Company force suffered 428 dead, 1,138 wounded, and 18 missing—1,584 casualties, or more than one-third of the troops engaged.
Assaye mattered beyond the battlefield itself. It damaged Scindia and Berar's regular infantry, deprived them of most of their guns, and opened the way for further British victories at Argaon and Gawilghur. The battle was part of the Second Anglo-Maratha War, a conflict through which the Company expanded its influence over the political heartland of India. It was also the first major victory of Wellesley, who later became the Duke of Wellington. In later life, he remembered Assaye as the finest thing he had ever done in combat.
Background
The Maratha political crisis
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Maratha Empire was the principal political power standing between the East India Company and wider dominance in the Indian subcontinent. It was not a tightly centralised state. Authority was distributed among powerful leaders, including the Peshwa at Poona, Scindia, Holkar, the Bhonsle ruler of Berar, and the Gaekwad of Baroda. Rivalry among these leaders could be as important as their relations with the Company.
The immediate background to Assaye lay in the feud between Yashwantrao Holkar and Daulatrao Scindia. Their rivalry developed into civil war. In October 1802, Holkar defeated a combined force belonging to Scindia and Baji Rao II, the Peshwa and nominal overlord of the Maratha Empire, at the Battle of Poona.
Scindia withdrew northwards into his own territories. Baji Rao, driven from Poona, sought refuge with the East India Company at Bassein. He offered to accept Company authority over his external affairs if British support restored him to his position. Lord Mornington, the Governor-General of British India, saw the crisis as an opportunity to extend Company influence. In his view, the Maratha political system was the final major obstacle to British predominance across the subcontinent.
The Treaty of Bassein
The Treaty of Bassein was signed in December 1802. Under its terms, the Company agreed to restore Baji Rao II to Poona. In return, Baji Rao accepted British control over his foreign affairs and agreed to the permanent stationing of 6,000 Company troops at Poona.
The treaty was not simply a defensive arrangement. It placed the Peshwa, the nominal head of the Maratha Empire, under British protection. Other Maratha leaders regarded this as an unacceptable interference in their affairs and as a direct threat to the independence of the Maratha states.
Mornington's younger brother, Major-General Arthur Wellesley, was given command of the operation to restore Baji Rao. In March 1803, Wellesley marched from Mysore with approximately 15,000 Company troops and 9,000 Hyderabad allies. He entered Poona without opposition on 20 April, and Baji Rao was formally restored to his throne on 13 May.
The restoration did not settle the wider dispute. It made the Company an active power inside Maratha politics. Holkar raided Hyderabad in May, claiming that the Nizam of Hyderabad owed him money. The Nizam was a British ally, and his position gave the Company a reason to intervene further.
The road to war
Mornington attempted to manage the crisis through negotiations. Lieutenant-Colonel John Collins was sent to Scindia's camp to discuss his objections and propose a defensive alliance. But Scindia had already formed a military alliance with Raghoji II Bhonsle, the Raja of Berar. Together, they began assembling forces with the apparent aim of creating a coalition against the British.
Wellesley, who had been given control of the Company's military and political affairs in Central India in June, demanded that Scindia state his intentions and withdraw his troops. If he refused, Wellesley warned, war would follow. Negotiations continued for some time, but on 3 August Collins reported that Scindia would neither give a satisfactory answer nor withdraw his forces.
Wellesley then declared war on Scindia and Berar. He described the purpose as securing the interests of the British government and its allies.
The Company opened offensives from both north and south. In northern India, Lieutenant-General Gerard Lake advanced from Cawnpore against Scindia's principal northern army, commanded by the French mercenary Pierre Cuillier-Perron. In the Deccan, Wellesley took the field against the combined forces of Scindia and Berar.
Holkar remained hesitant to cooperate with his rival Scindia and stayed outside the active hostilities. The Gaekwad of Baroda placed himself under British protection. This left Scindia and Berar facing the Company in the Deccan without the full strength of every major Maratha power.
Prelude
Wellesley's operational plan
The Maratha army in the Deccan relied heavily on fast-moving cavalry. Its horsemen could live off the land, avoid a pitched battle, and threaten British communications and allied territory. Wellesley believed that a prolonged defensive war would be dangerous. He told Colonel James Stevenson, his senior subordinate, that “a long defensive war would ruin us and will answer no purpose whatever.”
Wellesley therefore planned a converging operation. His own force would move from the south and east, while Stevenson's separate force would approach from another direction. By manoeuvring on different routes, the British hoped to drive the Maratha army into a position where it could not escape without fighting.
Stevenson was sent from Hyderabad with an army of approximately 10,000 men. His task was to prevent Scindia and Berar from raiding eastwards into the Nizam's territory. Wellesley moved north from his camp near the Godavari River on 8 August with approximately 13,500 troops. His first major objective was Ahmednagar, a walled town and fort belonging to Scindia.
Ahmednagar and the advance north
Wellesley reached Ahmednagar after a march of seven miles on the same day. Rather than begin a lengthy siege, he ordered an escalade assault on the town. Its garrison included about 1,000 Arab mercenaries, more than 60 cannon, and a battalion of Scindia's infantry commanded by French officers.
The town fell after a brief action with minimal British losses. The adjoining fort held out for four days, surrendering after British artillery breached its walls. Ahmednagar provided a secure base for future operations in Maratha territory.
Wellesley then moved north towards Aurangabad, a city belonging to the Nizam. During the advance, he captured other Scindia possessions south of the Godavari. He also established guarded bridges and ferries along the river, protecting the route by which supplies and communications could reach his army.
The Maratha army, however, remained mobile. It slipped past Stevenson and advanced towards Hyderabad. On receiving reports of this movement on 30 August, Wellesley hurried east towards the Godavari in an attempt to intercept it. Stevenson moved west towards the Maratha city of Jalna, which he captured by storm.
Scindia learned of Wellesley's intentions and withdrew to a position north of Jalna. The Maratha army could not make a clean break from the British pursuit. Its plan to raid Hyderabad was abandoned, and Scindia instead gathered his infantry and artillery for a major engagement.
The Maratha army
The combined Maratha force was around 50,000 strong, although its components varied greatly in organisation and battlefield value. At its core were approximately 10,800 well-equipped regular infantry. These troops were arranged in three brigades, trained and commanded by European adventurers and mercenary officers.
The largest brigade contained eight battalions and was commanded by Colonel Anthony Pohlmann, a Hanoverian who had formerly served as a sergeant in the East India Company's forces. A second brigade contained five battalions. It was associated with Begum Samru and commanded on her behalf by the French officer Colonel Jean Saleur. The third, four-battalion brigade was commanded by Major John James Dupont, a Dutchman.
The army also included 10,000 to 20,000 irregular infantry from Berar. Its cavalry numbered approximately 30,000 to 40,000 irregular light horse. More than 100 guns completed the force, with weapons ranging from small pieces to 18-pounders.
This was a formidable army in numbers and firepower. Its weakness lay in its mixed composition. The regular infantry and artillery had been organised on European lines and could fight a disciplined action. Much of the cavalry, however, was irregular and was better suited to raiding, pursuit, and attacks on communications than to striking a formed infantry line.
The British convergence
After several weeks of movement and counter-marching, Wellesley and Stevenson met at Budnapoor on 21 September. They received intelligence that the Maratha army was at Borkardan, approximately 30 miles away. The two commanders agreed to move separately along either side of a range of hills. Wellesley would advance on the eastern side and Stevenson on the western side, with both armies converging on Borkardan on 24 September.
Wellesley's force reached Paugy on the afternoon of 22 September and left camp before dawn. By noon, it had marched 14 miles to Naulniah, a small town 12 miles south of Borkardan. The army intended to rest there before joining Stevenson for an attack the following day.
At Naulniah, Wellesley received new intelligence. The Maratha army was not at Borkardan. It was encamped only five miles north, while its cavalry had moved away and its infantry appeared ready to follow. The information created an opportunity, but it also carried a risk. Stevenson was still separated from Wellesley, and the Maratha force was much larger than the troops immediately available to the British commander.
At about 1 p.m., Wellesley rode forward with a cavalry escort to reconnoitre. The rest of the army followed closely, except for one sepoy battalion left at Naulniah to guard the baggage. Wellesley had approximately 4,500 troops, supported by 5,000 Mysore and allied Maratha horse and 17 guns.
He expected to find a moving or partially prepared force. Instead, he saw the combined Maratha army in a strong defensive position.
The Event
The Maratha position
The Maratha encampment stood on a tongue of land extending east from Borkardan. The Kaitna River and its tributary, the Juah, protected the position. Scindia and Berar were not present at the moment of contact; they had moved away earlier in the day. Command fell to Anthony Pohlmann, who placed the regular infantry east of the Maratha camp on the plain around Assaye, on the southern bank of the Juah.
Pohlmann initially deployed his infantry facing south behind the steep banks of the Kaitna. His guns stood directly in front of the line. The mass of Maratha cavalry formed on the right flank, while Berar's irregular infantry occupied Assaye behind the main position.
The apparent crossing point over the Kaitna was a small ford directly in front of the Maratha army. An attack there would have forced the British into the mouth of the Maratha artillery. Wellesley's local guides told him that no other ford existed nearby.
Wellesley rejected a frontal assault. While examining the ground, he noticed two villages—Peepulgaon and Waroor—one on each bank of the Kaitna beyond the Maratha left. He suspected that a crossing might lie between them. Captain John Johnson, his chief engineer, reconnoitred the area and confirmed the existence of a ford.
This decision changed the shape of the battle. Instead of attacking the visible front, Wellesley moved east towards the unexpected crossing, intending to turn the Maratha left.
The crossing and redeployment
At approximately 3 p.m., the British crossed to the northern bank of the Kaitna. The crossing was unopposed except for distant fire from Maratha guns. Much of this fire was inaccurate, but one shot decapitated Wellesley's dragoon orderly.
Once across the river, Wellesley organised his six infantry battalions into two lines. His cavalry formed a reserve in a third line. The allied Mysore and Maratha cavalry remained south of the Kaitna, where they were intended to contain the large body of Maratha cavalry near the British rear.
Pohlmann quickly understood what Wellesley was attempting. He swung his infantry and artillery through 90 degrees and formed a new line approximately one mile long. Its right flank rested on the Kaitna, and its left reached Assaye.
The redeployment was faster and more effective than Wellesley had expected. It prevented him from simply turning the Maratha flank and also narrowed the ground on which the Maratha numerical superiority could be used. The new position, bounded by the rivers and the village, offered protection to the Maratha flanks but restricted Pohlmann's ability to deploy his entire army.
Wellesley responded by extending his own front. A battalion of pickets and the 74th Highlanders had been placed on the right of his first and second lines. They were ordered to move obliquely to the right. The 78th Highlanders anchored the left, while four Madras infantry battalions—the 1/10th, 1/8th, 1/4th, and 2/12th—formed the centre.
The intention was to force the Maratha line away from its guns, avoid the strongest defences around Assaye on the British left, and drive the defeated army towards the Juah. Cavalry would then complete the destruction of the position.
The artillery fire
The Maratha cannonade intensified as the British line formed. The Company guns were brought forward to answer, but they could not match the concentration of Maratha fire. The British artillery was quickly disabled under the weight of shot.
Maratha gunners fired canister, grape, and round shot into the advancing infantry. The artillery tore gaps in the British line. Casualties rose rapidly, but the infantry continued forward, closing up as files fell.
Wellesley concluded that there was no safe alternative. If the infantry remained exposed, the artillery would continue to destroy them. He ordered his own guns to be abandoned and directed the infantry to advance with bayonets fixed.
The order illustrates the central danger of the battle. The British force was outnumbered and had lost the contest between its artillery and the much larger Maratha battery. Its chance lay in reaching the guns before the cannonade destroyed the line.
The infantry attack
The 78th Highlanders reached the Maratha position first in the southern sector, close to the Kaitna. They halted about 50 yards from the gunners and fired a musket volley. They then charged with bayonets.
The four Madras infantry battalions to the right of the 78th, accompanied by the Madras Pioneers, reached the line soon afterwards. They attacked in the same manner. The Maratha gunners remained beside their weapons, but they could not withstand the bayonet assault. British and Madras troops pushed through the artillery position and advanced towards the Maratha infantry.
Rather than meet the attack, the Maratha right broke and fled northwards towards the Juah. The southern half of the line followed. The Madras battalions, encouraged by their success, pushed too far in pursuit, and their officers temporarily lost control of the formation.
Maratha cavalry threatened to counterattack. The 78th Highlanders, however, had maintained order. They re-formed and faced the danger, preventing the cavalry from exploiting the disorder among the Madras troops.
The crisis on the British right
The northern sector of the battlefield developed differently. Lieutenant-Colonel William Orrock, commanding the pickets, misunderstood his orders. Instead of moving only obliquely to the right, he continued directly towards Assaye. Major Samuel Swinton of the 74th Regiment was ordered to support him and followed close behind.
The mistake opened a large gap in the British centre. The pickets and the 74th came under concentrated artillery fire from the guns around Assaye and from the Maratha left. Both battalions began to fall back in disorder.
Pohlmann saw the opportunity and sent forward his remaining infantry and cavalry. The Maratha troops attacked without quarter. The pickets were almost annihilated. The 74th, originally about 500 strong, suffered devastating losses. Ten officers were killed and seven wounded; 124 other ranks were killed and 270 wounded.
The survivors of the 74th formed a rough square behind hastily piled bodies. Their formation prevented the Maratha attack from completely destroying them, but their position was precarious. The destruction of the British right would expose the rest of Wellesley's army to an attack in the flank.
Wellesley ordered Colonel Patrick Maxwell to intervene. Maxwell commanded the 19th Light Dragoons and elements of the 4th and 5th Madras Native Cavalry. From the rear, the cavalry charged directly towards the threatened square.
The charge struck the attacking Maratha force and routed it. Maxwell continued across the battlefield, driving Maratha infantry and gunners backwards and across the Juah. His attack relieved the pressure on the 74th and restored the immediate balance on the British right.
Recapture of the guns
The initial British advance had not completely silenced the Maratha artillery. Some gunners had feigned death when the British infantry passed over their positions. Once the first wave of troops had gone forward, these men returned to their pieces and began firing into the rear of the 74th and the Madras infantry.
Wellesley ordered the four sepoy battalions to reform and guard against renewed attacks from Maratha infantry and cavalry. He sent the 78th Highlanders back to retake the gun line.
At the same time, Wellesley rode to the 7th Madras Native Cavalry, which had been held in reserve to the east. He personally led a charge from the opposite direction. The Maratha gunners once again stood by their weapons. They were eventually driven away, and this time the British ensured that the captured guns could not be remanned.
Wellesley lost his second horse during this phase of the battle. His first had already been shot from under him. The second was speared as he led the charge to recapture the Maratha guns.
The final Maratha position
While Wellesley was engaged with the artillery, Pohlmann rallied the Maratha infantry. He redeployed them in a semicircle with their backs to the Juah. Their right flank crossed the river, and their left rested on Assaye.
The position remained potentially dangerous. The Maratha regular infantry had shown that it could redeploy under pressure, and its artillery had inflicted heavy losses. But the army had lost most of the guns that had given it its greatest advantage. Many pieces lay abandoned on the battlefield or had been captured.
The irregular cavalry remained at a distance to the west. Much of it consisted of Pindaris—loosely organised and lightly armed horsemen whose customary roles were raiding, attacking supply lines, harassing an enemy, and pursuing troops already in flight. They were not trained to charge formed infantry or heavily armed cavalry. Their failure to intervene decisively left Pohlmann's infantry without the full support of the army's numerical strength.
Maxwell had rallied his cavalry and returned to the field. Wellesley ordered him to attack the Maratha left while the infantry advanced against the centre and right.
The cavalry moved forward but met a volley of canister. Maxwell was killed instantly. His death halted the momentum of the charge, and the cavalry veered away rather than complete the attack against the Maratha line.
The British and Madras infantry nevertheless continued their advance. Pohlmann's troops, with low morale and much of their artillery gone, did not wait for the final assault. They withdrew northwards across the Juah.
Maratha accounts described the infantry as marching away in an orderly manner on Pohlmann's orders. British accounts characterised the movement as an uncontrolled panic. The different descriptions reflect the contrasting perspectives of the combatants. In either case, the Maratha position was abandoned.
The irregular troops in Assaye, having seen the regular infantry withdraw and now lacking effective leadership, left the village at around 6 p.m. The Maratha cavalry followed soon afterwards.
Why there was no pursuit
Wellesley's victory was not followed by a sustained pursuit. His troops were exhausted, and the battle had left the army badly damaged. The allied cavalry south of the Kaitna had not been engaged and refused to pursue without the support of the British and Madras cavalry.
The decision not to pursue meant that Scindia and Berar's army was not completely destroyed on 23 September. It remained capable of further action, although its regular infantry, artillery, and command structure had been badly weakened.
Participants
The East India Company army
Arthur Wellesley commanded the Company force. He was 34 years old and had already conducted the restoration of Baji Rao II at Poona. Assaye was his first major battlefield victory.
His force included Company troops from Mysore, five sepoy battalions of the Madras Native Infantry, and three squadrons of Madras Native Cavalry. British regulars included the 19th Light Dragoons and the 74th and 78th Regiments of Foot. Irregular light cavalry also came from Mysore and from Maratha allies of the Company.
Wellesley's strength was not numerical. His immediate force was far smaller than the combined Maratha army, and his artillery was rapidly overwhelmed. His principal advantages were disciplined infantry, the ability to manoeuvre under pressure, and the willingness to attack before the Maratha army could withdraw.
The British and Madras infantry suffered particularly heavily. The 74th Regiment and the picket battalion were decimated. Of the ten officers forming Wellesley's general staff, eight were wounded or had their horses killed. These losses demonstrate how close the battle came to becoming a defeat despite its final outcome.
Colonel Patrick Maxwell played a crucial part in the battle. His cavalry charge saved the endangered 74th and drove back the Maratha troops threatening the British right. He was killed later in the battle by canister fire while attempting to attack the re-formed Maratha line.
Colonel James Stevenson commanded the separate British force intended to converge with Wellesley. He did not take part in the action. He heard the sound of the guns and immediately broke camp, attempting to reach the battlefield. A guide misled him, however, and he marched first towards Borkardan. Stevenson arrived only on the evening of 24 September, the day after the battle.
The combined Maratha army
The Maratha army represented the forces of Daulatrao Scindia and Raghoji II Bhonsle. Its numerical strength, extensive artillery, and large cavalry arm made it a dangerous opponent.
Scindia's army included regular infantry organised and trained by European officers. The largest brigade was commanded by Anthony Pohlmann. Begum Samru's brigade was commanded on her behalf by Jean Saleur, while John James Dupont commanded the third brigade.
Although Scindia and Berar were associated with the army, they had moved away from the immediate area on the morning of the battle. Pohlmann consequently directed the battlefield deployment and managed the redeployment after Wellesley crossed the Kaitna.
Pohlmann's initial response to the British manoeuvre was effective. He shifted his line through 90 degrees, placed his right on the Kaitna and his left on Assaye, and prevented Wellesley from turning the Maratha position as easily as he had intended. The artillery also performed strongly, inflicting the largest share of British casualties.
The Maratha army's weakness was its lack of unity. The regular infantry fought more effectively than the irregular troops, while the great mass of cavalry remained largely ineffective. Once the artillery was lost and the infantry began to withdraw, the different elements of the army did not combine for a decisive counterstroke.
Several European officers later surrendered to the Company or deserted. The Company had offered amnesty to Europeans serving in the Maratha armies. Among those who surrendered or left were Pohlmann and Dupont. The loss of experienced officers further damaged Scindia's military organisation.
Aftermath
Losses and captured equipment
The East India Company reported 428 killed, 1,138 wounded, and 18 missing. The total was 1,584 casualties. The figure represented more than one-third of the force engaged.
The losses among the 74th were especially severe. Out of approximately 500 men, the regiment lost ten officers killed, seven wounded, 124 other ranks killed, and 270 wounded. The pickets lost every officer except their commander, Lieutenant-Colonel William Orrock, and were reduced to about 75 men.
Maratha casualties are more difficult to establish. British officers reported approximately 1,200 dead and many more wounded. Modern estimates mentioned in the historical record place total Maratha dead and wounded as high as 6,000. The difference between these figures reflects the difficulty of counting losses after a battle in which the defeated army withdrew and the battlefield contained a large number of irregular troops.
The Marathas surrendered seven stands of colours, substantial stores and ammunition, and 98 cannon. Most of the captured guns were later taken into East India Company service. The loss of the artillery was strategically important. The Maratha army's guns had been its most effective weapon at Assaye, and their capture deprived it of the means to reproduce the same defensive power immediately.
Stevenson and the wounded
Stevenson remained with Wellesley to help care for the wounded. Troops were still being carried from the battlefield four days after the engagement. Stevenson later had the guide who had misled him hanged, believing that the man had deliberately taken him away from the battle.
On 26 September, Stevenson was ordered to resume the pursuit of the Maratha army. Wellesley stayed to the south, established a hospital at Ajanta, and awaited reinforcements from Poona.
The battle had shown both the possibilities and the risks of Wellesley's aggressive approach. He had achieved a major victory without waiting for Stevenson, but the casualties were so severe that the force could not exploit the result immediately.
Further victories in the Deccan
Assaye did not by itself end the war. Scindia and Berar's army remained capable of resistance, even though its regular units and artillery had suffered heavily.
Two months later, Wellesley combined with Stevenson and defeated the weakened Maratha army at Argaon. He then stormed Berar's fortress at Gawilghur. These victories, together with Gerard Lake's successful campaign in northern India, forced the two Maratha leaders to seek peace.
The campaign therefore operated on two levels. At the tactical level, Assaye was a single battle decided by infantry attacks, cavalry intervention, and the capture of artillery. At the strategic level, it formed part of a wider British effort to break the military and political independence of major Maratha powers.
Historical Significance
A costly Company victory
Assaye demonstrated that a disciplined Company army could defeat a much larger Maratha force in a pitched battle. It did not do so through superior artillery or overwhelming numbers. The British guns were quickly disabled, and the infantry had to advance through a destructive cannonade.
Wellesley's decision to use the ford near Peepulgaon and Waroor prevented the British from attacking directly into the strongest part of the Maratha position. The subsequent infantry assault neutralised the guns, while cavalry charges prevented the Maratha army from exploiting the crisis on the British right.
Yet the victory should not be reduced to a simple story of British superiority. The Maratha artillery performed effectively, the initial redeployment was rapid, and the Company army paid a very high price. The Maratha cavalry's failure to intervene and the difficulty of coordinating the army's different elements were as important to the result as British discipline.
The weakening of Maratha power
The destruction or capture of most of the Maratha guns and the damage to the regular infantry weakened Scindia and Berar at a critical moment. Their armies had been assembled to resist the Company's intervention following the Treaty of Bassein. After Assaye, Argaon, and Gawilghur, they no longer possessed the same military leverage.
The campaign did not erase the Maratha political system immediately. It did, however, alter the balance among the major powers of India. The Company had intervened in the succession and restoration of the Peshwa, defeated two major Maratha armies in the Deccan, and supported its military operations with a successful northern campaign under Lake.
The result was a major expansion of Company influence. The progress of Wellesley in the Deccan and Lake in northern India helped make the British the dominant power in the heartland of India.
Wellesley's military reputation
Assaye was Wellesley's first major success. Its reputation accompanied him through the rest of his career. He later fought in the Peninsular War and defeated Napoleon at Waterloo, but he continued to rank Assaye above those better-known victories when judging his own battlefield achievements.
His later comments also acknowledged the human cost. He told Stevenson that he would not like to see such a loss again, even if it brought a gain of the same kind. On another occasion, he described Assaye as “the bloodiest for the numbers that I ever saw.”
The battle therefore occupied an unusual place in his memory. It was both a source of professional pride and a reminder of the consequences of attacking a strongly armed enemy with an outnumbered force.
Legacy
The East India Company treated Assaye as a major victory. Lord Mornington and his Council called it a “most brilliant and important victory.” The Madras units and British regiments that took part received honorary colours. The British regiments and native units involved were awarded the Assaye battle honour.
Many of these units were later permitted to adopt an Assaye elephant as part of their insignia. The 74th Regiment of Foot became known as the Assaye regiment because of its stand during the battle. Its modern successors, the Royal Highland Fusiliers, or 2 SCOTS, continued to mark the anniversary of the engagement.
The Company also erected a public monument at Fort William in Calcutta to commemorate the victory. The monument placed Assaye within the imperial memory of the Company, presenting the engagement as a triumph of British and Indian troops serving under Company command.
The memory of the battle has been more complicated in India. Of the native infantry units involved, only the Madras Sappers survive in their original form in the Indian Army. They no longer celebrate Assaye because the Government of India has declared it a repugnant battle honour. This later judgement reflects the battle's association with colonial conquest rather than treating it only as a regimental achievement.
Assaye has also appeared in historical fiction. Bernard Cornwell's novel Sharpe's Triumph depicts the campaign and battle through the fictional soldier Richard Sharpe. In the novel, Sharpe earns a battlefield promotion after saving Wellesley's life. The television adaptation changes this event, showing Sharpe saving Wellesley from French soldiers during the later Peninsular War instead.
Historiography
Accounts of Assaye differ in how they explain both the victory and the conduct of the two armies.
British accounts traditionally emphasised Wellesley's boldness, the discipline of the infantry, and the decisive effect of the cavalry charges. They presented the battle as a victory won against severe numerical odds. The survival of the 74th's remnants, the recapture of the guns, and the advance of the British and Madras infantry became central elements in the regimental memory of the battle.
These accounts also accepted that the victory was exceptionally costly. Wellesley's own later remarks and the criticism of Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Munro show that the decision to attack before Stevenson arrived was debated even at the time. Munro, the Company's district collector at Mysore, questioned whether Wellesley had acted partly to claim the glory of victory with the smallest possible force. Wellesley rejected the accusation and defended his decision as necessary because he had received incorrect intelligence about the Maratha position.
The Maratha conduct has also been interpreted differently. British accounts described the final withdrawal of Pohlmann's infantry as a panic. Maratha accounts presented the movement as an orderly retreat conducted on Pohlmann's orders. Both interpretations agree that the Maratha army abandoned the field, but they assign different meanings to the withdrawal.
Modern historical treatment tends to stress the battle's complexity. The Maratha army was not simply an undisciplined mass. Its regular infantry had been trained by European officers, its artillery inflicted severe losses, and Pohlmann responded competently to Wellesley's unexpected crossing. At the same time, the army's different forces did not act as a unified whole. The irregular cavalry was poorly suited to attacking formed troops, and the loss of the guns and European officers damaged the army's ability to continue the campaign.
The battle is therefore best understood as both a military achievement and a colonial expansionist victory. Its immediate tactical drama—bayonet attacks, cavalry charges, and the capture of artillery—cannot be separated from the political outcome. The Company was using military force to impose its preferred settlement on the Maratha states after the Treaty of Bassein.